Representing defeasibility is an important issue in common sense reasoning. In reasoning about action and change, this issue becomes more difficult because domain and action related defeasible information may conflict with general inertia rules. Furthermore, different types of defeasible information may also interfere with each other during the reasoning. In this paper, we develop a prioritized logic programming approach to handle defeasibilities in reasoning about action. In particular, we propose three action languages AT 0 , AT 1 and AT 2 which handle three types of defeasibilities in action domains named defeasible constraints, defeasible observations and actions with defeasible and abnormal effects respectively. Each language with a higher superscript can be viewed as an extension of the language with a lower superscript. These action languages inherit the simple syntax of A language but their semantics is developed in terms of transition systems where transition functions are defined based on prioritized logic programs. By illustrating various examples, we show that our approach eventually provides a powerful mechanism to handle various defeasibilities in temporal prediction and postdiction. We also investigate semantic properties of these three action languages and characterize classes of action domains that present more desirable solutions in reasoning about action within the underlying action languages.
Introduction
Representing defeasibility is an important issue in common sense reasoning. In reasoning about action, this issue becomes more difficult because domain and action related defeasible information may conflict with general inertia rules -that are necessary to specify things that persist with respect to actions and usually defeasible as well. Furthermore, different types of defeasible information may also interfere with each other during the reasoning. Therefore, most previous action theories usually ignored such defeasible information in problem domains. However, recent work on causality reveals that in many situations defeasibility plays an important role in temporal prediction and postdiction and ignoring this issue may cause difficulties in deriving correct solutions in reasoning about action.
Let us consider the Switch-Power domain that was first addressed in (Zhang, 1999) , where two domain constraints were taken into account:
if the switch is on, then the light is usually on;
if there is no power, then the light is not on.
Intuitively, the first constraint is defeasible from our common sense. For instance , even if the switch is on, the light might not be on if there is no power, or there is a problem in the circuit, and so on. But if this constraint is not expressed as a defeasible rule, we may have a difficulty in our reasoning. Suppose we simply represent the above two constraints as logical implications Switch ⊃ On and ¬Power ⊃ ¬On respectively. If the initial state is {On, Power , Switch} and the robot is asked to perform an action Cut -Power with effect ¬Power (e.g. a fire alarm leads the robot to perform this action). Clearly, Cut -Power will cause a direct effect ¬Power , and then from constraint Switch ⊃ On and ¬Power ⊃ ¬On, an indirect effect ¬Switch is derived. Obviously, this effect is not quite reasonable from our intuition as cutting off the power should be irrelevant to the switch's position. People may argue that the above problem is due to the duality of logical implication (i.e. A ⊃ B ≡ ¬B ⊃ ¬A). Now suppose we adopt McCain and Turn's causal theory (McCain & Turner, 1995) where constraints (1) and (2) are represented as inference rules Switch ⇒ On and ¬Power ⇒ ¬On respectively 1 . Then under the same initial state as above, it turns out that action Cut -Power becomes unexecutable because the effect ¬Power together with rule ¬Power ⇒ ¬On contradicts fact On which is derivable from fact Switch and rule Switch ⇒ On. This is not a desirable solution either.
The above example just illustrates one type of defeasibility -defeasible constraints, which causes difficulties in reasoning about action. In fact, there are other types of defeasible information, such as defeasible observations and actions with defeasible and abnormal effects, that also significantly influence temporal prediction and postdiction. Although the problem of defeasibilities has been investigated by some researchers recently, e.g. (Baral & Lobo, 1997; Geffner, 1997; Jab lonowski et al., 1996; Zhang, 1999) , none of the previous proposals is completely satisfactory in terms of representing and handling different types of defeasibilities in temporal reasoning (we will discuss this issue in section 7).
In this paper, we address three basic types of defeasible information related to temporal prediction and postdiction where incomplete information is allowable: defeasible constraints, defeasible observations and actions with defeasible and abnormal effects. Our goal is to handle these three types of defeasibilities in reasoning about action under a unified framework of logic programming.
The issue of representing action in logic programming languages is not new. It was explored by some researchers previously, e.g. (Eshghi & Kowalski, 1989) . However, probably Gelfond and Lifschitz's work (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1993) was the first time to make a major progress in this direction. By introducing a simple action language A, Gelfond and Lifschitz's action formulation was able to deal with both temporal prediction and postdiction, while properties of actions were characterized by translating action language A into the language of extended logic programs (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991) . In other words, in Gelfond and Lifschitz's formulation, extended logic program was used as an implementation of the high level action language A.
It has been recognized that logic programming can not only be used as the implementation of a high level action language, but also can be used as a basis for providing a formal semantics of the high level language, e.g. (Baral & Lobo, 1997) . In this paper, we further demonstrate that prioritized logic programming has a great flexibility to serve as a semantic basis to develop high level action languages that handle various information conflicts in reasoning about action. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the concept of prioritized logic programs. Section 3 proposes a simple action language AT 0 which can represent actions in domains with defeasible constraints. The syntax of AT 0 is similar to that of A style action languages. A transition system is proposed to provide a formal semantics of AT 0 , where a corresponding prioritized logic program is employed as a basis for defining such a transition system. Section 4 then extends action language AT 0 to AT 1 so that it can represent defeasible observations and shows how it handles the problem of temporal postdiction under the occurrence of defeasible observations. Section 5 further generalizes AT 1 to action language AT 2 to represent actions with defeasible and abnormal effects. Section 6 then investigates various properties of action languages AT 0 , AT 1 and AT 2 and characterize specific classes of action domains that may present desirable solutions in reasoning about action. Section 7 discusses related work, and finally section 8 concludes the paper with some remarks.
Prioritized Logic Programs (PLPs): An Overview
We first introduce the extended logic program and its answer set semantics developed by Gelfond and Lifschitz (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991) . A language L of extended logic programs is determined by its object constants, function constants and predicate constants. Terms are built as in the corresponding first order language; atoms have the form P (t 1 , · · · , t n ), where t i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a term and P is a predicate constant of arity n; a literal is either an atom P (t 1 , · · · , t n ) or a negative atom ¬P (t 1 , · · · , t n ). A rule is an expression of the form:
where each L i (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is a literal. L 0 is called the head of the rule, while {L 1 , · · · , L m , notL m+1 , · · ·, notL n } is called the body of the rule. Obviously, the body of a rule could be empty. We also allow the head of a rule to be empty. In this case, the rule with an empty head is called constraint. A term, atom, literal, or rule is ground if no variable occurs in it. An extended logic program Π is a collection of rules. Π is ground if each rule in Π is ground.
To evaluate an extended logic program, Gelfond and Lifschitz proposed an answer set semantics for extended logic programs. Let Π be a ground extended logic program not containing not and Lit the set of all ground literals in the language of Π. An answer set of Π is the smallest subset S of Lit such that (i) for any rule
, then L 0 ∈ S ; and (ii) if S contains a pair of complementary literals, then S = Lit . Now let Π be a ground arbitrary extended logic program. For any subset S of Lit , let Π S be the logic program obtained from Π by deleting (i) each rule that has a formula not L in its body with L ∈ S , and (ii) all formulas of the form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules 2 . We define that S is an answer set of Π iff S is an answer set of Π S . For a non-ground extended logic program Π, we usually view a rule in Π containing variables to be the set of all ground instances of this rule formed from the set of ground literals in the language. The collection of all these ground rules forms the ground instantiation Π ′ of Π. Then a set of ground literals is an answer set of Π if and only if it is an answer set of Π ′ . It is easy to see that an extended logic program may have one, more than one, or no answer set at all.
A prioritized logic program (PLP) P is a triple (Π, N , <), where Π is an extended logic program, N is a naming function mapping each rule in Π to a name, and < is a strict partial ordering on names. The partial ordering < in P plays an essential role in the evaluation of P. We also use P(<) to denote the set of <-relations of P. Intuitively < represents a preference of applying rules during the evaluation of the program. In particular, if N (r ) < N (r ′ ) holds in P, rule r would be preferred to apply over rule r ′ during the evaluation of P (i.e. rule r is more preferred than rule r ′ ). Consider the following classical example represented in our formalism: P1 = (Π, N , <): N1 : Fly(x ) ← Bird (x ), not ¬Fly(x ), N2 : ¬Fly(x ) ← Penguin(x ), not Fly(x ), N3 : Bird (Tweety) ←, N4 : Penguin(Tweety) ←, N2 < N1.
Obviously, rules N 1 and N 2 conflict with each other as their heads are complementary literals, and applying N 1 will defeat N 2 and vice versa. However, as N 2 < N 1 , we would expect that rule N 2 is preferred to apply first and then defeat rule N 1 so that the desired solution ¬Fly(Tweety) can be derived.
Definition 1
Let Π be a ground extended logic program and r a ground rule of the form (3) (r does not necessarily belong to Π). Rule r is defeated by Π iff Π has an answer set and for any answer set S of Π, there exists some L i ∈ S , where m + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Now our idea of evaluating a PLP is as follows. Let P = (Π, N , <). If there are two rules r and r ′ in Π and N (r ) < N (r ′ ), r ′ will be ignored in the evaluation of P, only if keeping r in Π and deleting r ′ from Π will result in a defeat of r ′ . By eliminating all such potential rules from Π, P is eventually reduced to an extended logic program in which the partial ordering < has been removed. Our evaluation for P is then based on this reduced extended logic program.
Similarly to the case of extended logic programs, the evaluation of a PLP will be based on its ground form. We say that a PLP and r ′ 2 are ground instances of r 1 and r 2 respectively and N (r 1 ) < N (r 2 ) ∈ P(<). Under this definition, however, we require a restriction on a PLP since not every PLP's ground instantiation presents a consistent information with respect to the original PLP. Consider a PLP as follows:
If the only constant in the language is 0, then the set of ground instances of N 1 and N 2 includes rules like:
It is easy to see that N ′ 2 can be viewed as an instance for both N 1 and N 2 . Therefore, the ordering
Obviously, we need to exclude this kind of programs in our context. On the other hand, we also want to avoid a situation like
in the ground prioritized logic program because this < ′ indicates that there is no most preferred rule in the program.
Given a PLP P = (Π, N , <). We say that P is well formed if there is no rule r ′ that is an instance of two different rules r 1 and r 2 in Π and N (r 1 ) < N (r 2 ) ∈ P(<).
Then it is not difficult to observe that the following fact holds.
Fact: If a PLP P = (Π, N , <) is well formed, then in its ground instantiation
′ is a partial ordering and every non-empty subset of Π ′ has a least element with respect to < ′ .
Due to the above fact, in the rest of this paper, we will only consider well formed PLP programs in our discussions, and consequently, the evaluation for an arbitrary PLP P = (Π, N , <) will be based on its ground instantiation P ′ = (Π ′ , N ′ , < ′ ). Therefore, in our context a ground prioritized (or extended) logic program may contain infinite number of rules. In this case, we will assume that this ground program is the ground instantiation of some program that only contains finite number of rules. In the rest of the paper, whenever there is no confusion, we will only consider ground prioritized (extended) logic programs without explicit declaration.
Definition 2 (Zhang & Foo, 1997a) Let P = (Π, N , <) be a prioritized logic program. P < is a reduct of P with respect to < if and only if there exists a sequence of sets Π i (i = 0, 1, · · ·) such that:
1. Π 0 = Π; 2. Π i = Π i−1 − {r 1 , r 2 , · · · | (a) there exists r ∈ Π i−1 such that for every j (j = 1, 2, · · ·), N (r ) < N (r j ) ∈ P(<) and r 1 , r 2 , · · · are defeated by Π i−1 − {r 1 , r 2 , · · ·}, and (b) there
< is an extended logic program obtained from Π by eliminating some rules from Π. In particular, if N (r ) < N (r 1 ), N (r ) < N (r 2 ), · · ·, and Π i−1 − {r 1 , r 2 , · · ·} defeats {r 1 , r 2 , · · ·}, then rules r 1 , r 2 , · · · will be eliminated from Π i−1 if no less preferred rule can be eliminated (i.e. conditions (a) and (b)). This procedure is continued until a fixed point is reached. It should be noted that condition (b) in the above definition is necessary because without it some unintuitive results may be derived. For instance, consider P 1 again, if we add additional preference N 3 < N 2 in P 1 , then using a modified version of Definition 2 without condition (b),
is a reduct of P 1 , from which we will conclude that Tweety can fly.
Theorem 1
Every PLP has a reduct.
Definition 3 (Zhang & Foo, 1997a ) Let P = (Π, N , <) be a PLP and Lit the set of all ground literals in the language of P. For any subset S of Lit , S is an answer set of P iff S is an answer set for some reduct P < of P.
Example 1
Using Definitions 2 and 3, it is easy to conclude that P 1 has a unique reduct as follows:
from which we obtain the following answer set of P 1 :
Now we consider another program P 2 :
According to Definition 2, it is easy to see that P 2 has two reducts:
From Definition 3, it follows that P 2 has two answer sets: {A, C , D } and {A, B , D }.
3
AT 0 : Representing Actions in Domains with Defeasible Constraints
In this section, we develop an action language AT 0 which is able to handle domains with defeasible constraints. The syntax of language AT 0 is inspired by A family languages, and a transition system will be developed to provide the semantics of AT 0 where a corresponding prioritized logic program is employed to define the transition function.
Syntax of AT

0
The language AT 0 has two disjoint sets of names called actions and fluents. We will use A, A 1 , A 2 , · · · to denote action names , and F , F 1 , F 2 , · · · to denote fluent names. We define a fluent expression to be a fluent name possibly preceded by a negation sign ¬.
A value proposition is an expression of the form:
where L is a fluent expression and A 1 , · · · , A l are action names. A value proposition is also called an initial proposition if no action name occurs in it:
A causal proposition is an expression of the form:
where L, L 1 , · · · , L n are fluent expressions. This is so-called defeasible constraint whose intuitive meaning is that L is caused to be true if L 1 , · · · , L m are true and L m+1 , · · · , L n are not present. As a special case, (6) is reduced to a non-defeasible causal rule if no absent fluent expression is mentioned:
An action effect proposition is an expression of the form:
where A is an action name and
then action A causes L to be true. Note the difference between (7) and (8) while no action is involved in the former. Now we define a domain description D of AT 0 to be a finite set of initial propositions, causal propositions and action effect propositions. It should be noted that here we do not include value propositions of the form (4) into a domain description since at the moment we restrict our formulation only to deal with prediction reasoning while a value proposition (4) is only used as a query statement in the language 3 . The following example shows how language AT 0 is used to describe an action domain.
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Example 2 Let us consider the Switch-Power domain mentioned in section 1 again. The domain includes two constraints: (a) if the switch is on, then the light is usually on; (b) if there is no power, then the light is not on. We treat the first constraint as a defeasible causal rule. We also suppose that initially the light is on, there is power and the switch is on. An action Cut -Power is then performed. It has been shown that the previous approaches have difficulties to deal with this example due to a lack of expressibility of defeasible constraints (Zhang, 1999) . This action scenario can be described by specifying a domain description D(Switch-Power ) of AT 0 as follows. Firstly, D(Switch-Power ) contains the following three initial propositions:
initially On, initially Power , initially Switch.
D(Switch-Power ) also includes the following two causal propositions to capture the domain constraints presented above:
On is caused if Switch with absence ¬On, ¬On is caused if ¬Power .
Finally, D(Switch-Power ) has one action effect proposition:
Cut-Power causes ¬Power .
Semantics of AT
0
Similarly to the idea presented in (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1993) , we will define a transition system to provide a formal semantics for AT 0 . However, instead of developing an independent transition system for the language, our transition function is defined based on the PLP. This is because the PLP has a powerful mechanism of solving conflicts between defeasible information, which, from our observation, is difficult to handle in the traditional transition system approach. 
Basically, rule (9) together with rule (11) 
Holds(F n , s) are true, then fluent F is caused to be true (or false resp.) in situation s. As it will be seen, in our following translation, rules (9) and (10) are actually related to the domain description D and hence are domain specific, while rules (11) and (12) act as generic rule schemas that are irrelevant to D and hence are domain independent. For simplicity, we denote Π c ind = {(11), (12)}· Atoms Effect + (f , s) and Effect − (f , s) are used to represent direct effects of actions. Generally, action effect rules have the following forms:
Intuitively, rule (13) (9) or (10). Two domain independent causal rules (11) and (12) are also included in this set. Action effect rules: For each action effect proposition (8), there is an action effect rule of the form (13) or (14). Two domain independent action effect rules (15) and (16) are also included in this set.
Inertia rules
6 :
2. Naming function N assigns a unique name to each rule in Π. 3. For each causal rule N c and each inertia rule N i , <-relation N c < N i holds.
In P AT 0 (D) specified above, Π represents initial facts, domain constraints (causal rules) and action effects corresponding to D, and inertia rules are used to capture things that do not change with respect to actions. Since we allow to represent defeasible causal rules while inertia rules are also defeasible, possible conflicts may occur between these two types of rules. To solve such conflicts, we specify that a causal rule is more preferred than an inertia rule. The intuition behind this is clear: generally causal rules are used to derive indirect effects of actions, and whenever there is no explicit condition to block a defeasible causal rule, this rule should be triggered to derive necessary indirect effects. This point is illustrated in Example 3 next. It is also obvious that to translate a specific domain description
we only need to translate domain specific information such as initial propositions, causal and action effect propositions into logic program rules, while other domain independent schema rules such as Π 
where Π i ind = {(17), (18)}.
5 Here Holds(F , S 0 ) or ¬Holds(F , S 0 ) is corresponding to whether L occurring in initially L is F or ¬F respectively. This assumption is also adopted in the rest of this paper. 6 Note that these two inertia rules actually represent a set of inertia rules by substituting fluent and action variables f and a with every fluent and action constants occurring in the domain respectively. 
Assigning a unique name to each rule in Π 0 ind . That is, we assign names N 7 , N 8 , N 9 , N 10 , N 11 and N 12 to rules (11), (12), (15) (16), (17) and (18) respectively. <-relations: N c < N i , while N c and N i are names of any causal rule and inertia rule in Π respectively. That is, we have
Transition function, models and entailment
To define the transition function, we first introduce the concept of state. A state is a collection of fluent expressions. A state is consistent if it does not contain a fluent F and its negative correspondent ¬F . We use symbolsŜ 0 ,Ŝ 1 ,Ŝ 2 , · · · to denote states. Then transition function R maps a state to a power set of states by some action.
Definition 5
Given a domain description D and its translation P 1. If A is empty or includes an inconsistent answer set of
It should be noted that we define a state to be a collection of fluent expressions, that is very different from the state defined in standard A-style action languages where states correspond to possible physical worlds and every fluent is either true or false in a state (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1993 Since two causal propositions conflict with each other and action A 1 is executable in the initial situation, it is not difficult to see that D's PLP translation
has two different answer sets such that Holds(F 2 , Result (A 1 , S 0 )) is in one and ¬Holds(F 2 , Result (A 1 , S 0 )) is in the other. Then from Definition 5, state transitions of D specified by transition function R can be described by the following diagram, where {F 1 } is the initial state: Fig. 1 . State transitions.
Let A denote an action string A 1 · · · A l (as a special case, an empty action string is denoted as ǫ). A structure Ψ is a partial function from strings of actions to states whose domain is prefix closed. We refer Ψ(ǫ) =Ŝ 0 , i.e. the initial state of D. The following definition describes possible trajectories of the dynamic system (domain description) defined in AT 0 under structure Ψ.
Definition 6
Given a structure Ψ.
1. An initial proposition of the form (5) is satisfied in Ψ if L ∈ Ψ(ǫ); 2. A causal proposition of the form (6) or an action effect proposition of the form (8) is satisfied in Ψ if the following conditions hold:
-for any action string A and action constant A, if Ψ(A) and
Definition 7
Given a domain description D, a structure Ψ is a model of D if all initial, causal and action effect propositions in D are satisfied in Ψ, and for any action string A and fluent F , F and ¬F are not both true in Ψ(A). We say a value proposition of the form (4):
has a unique answer set that includes the following ground literals 8 :
Holds(On, S0), Holds(Power , S0), Holds(Switch, S0), ¬Holds(Power , Result(Cut-Power , S0)), ¬Holds(On, Result(Cut-Power , S0)) and Holds(Switch, Result(Cut-Power , S0)).
SinceŜ 0 = {On, Power , Switch}, we have R(Cut -Power ,Ŝ 0 ) = {Ŝ 1 }, wherê S 1 = {¬On, ¬Power , Switch}. Now it is easy to see that structure Ψ is a model of D(Switch-Power ), where Ψ(ǫ) =Ŝ 0 and Ψ(Cut -Power ) =Ŝ 1 . Furthermore, according to Definition 7, we have
Now we slightly modify the domain of Switch-Power as stated in Example 2. Suppose initially the light is not on and the switch is off, and another action Turn-On is also available. Then the modified domain description D(Switch-Power ′ ) includes the following initial propositions:
initially ¬On, initially ¬Switch, and the action effect proposition Turn-On causes Switch, together with the effect proposition of action Cut -Power and two causal propositions as given in Example 2. Ignoring the detail, we can derive the following results:
AT 1 : Combining Defeasible Observations into Action Domains
We have shown that language AT 0 handles temporal prediction where defeasible constraints are admitted. It, however, cannot deal with temporal postdiction, e.g. within the framework of AT 0 we cannot reason from the current state to the past under some observations. It has been realized that observations on any intermidate states (including the final state) play an important role in temporal postdiction (Jab lonowski et al., 1996) . Here, an observation is viewed as an agent's beliefs about the domain that is either obtained from the outside world or from the agent's own assumption. In the case that an agent makes an observation under some assumption, such observation becomes defeasible because once the assumption is proved not to be true, the agent's observation should be defeated. In this section, we extend AT 0 to AT 1 such that the extended language can handle temporal prediction and postdiction where both defeasible constraints and observations are admitted.
Syntax of AT
1
The syntax of AT 1 is the same as AT 0 's except that AT 1 also has an observation proposition of the form:
where L, L 1 , · · · , L n are fluent expressions, and A 1 , · · · , A l are actions. Intuitively, (20) says after actions (20) represents a kind of defeasible information. In the case that no action occurs in (20), (20) can be written as the following form:
Under the language AT 1 , we define a domain description D to be a finite set of observation propositions, causal propositions and action effect propositions. AT 1 will still have the value proposition (4) and its special case the initial proposition (5), but are only used as query statements in AT 1 .
Example 5
Let us consider a modified shooting action scenario which we name Shooting-1. Suppose the turkey is observed alive in the initial situation, and as there is no explicit information about whether the gun is loaded in the initial situation, the agent would assume that the gun is initially not loaded by default. After actions Shoot and Wait are successively performed, it is observed that the turkey is dead (not alive). This scenario can be naturally described by language AT 1 . In particular,
we specify a domain description D(Shooting-1) which has the following observation propositions:
initially Alive is observed, initially ¬Loaded is observed with absence Loaded , ¬Alive is observed after Shoot, Wait, and an action effect proposition:
Semantics of AT
1
We will use a similar way as described in section 3.2 to develop a formal semantics of AT 1 based on a transition system that is defined on the basis of the translation from a AT 1 domain description into a PLP.
Translating AT 1 into PLP
As we have mentioned earlier, the major improvement from AT 0 to AT 1 is that we allow defeasible observations to be presented in a domain description so that temporal postdiction becomes possible. It is quite straightforward to translate an observation proposition of the form (20) into the following logic rule:
where
To do postdiction reasoning, for each action effect proposition in D, we need to have some action explanation rules which will be used to derive action preconditions based on proper observations. First, if there is an action effect rule (13), the following rule explains that the fact Holds(F , Result (A, s)) is caused by performing action A:
Clearly, the function of rule (23) is to identify action A's actual execution. The intuition is that if fluent F is true (or false, resp.) in situation Result (A, s), and there is no explicit information saying that F is true in the previous situation s or F is caused to be true by some causal rule, then it derives that F 's truth value in Result (A, s) is a direct effect of action A. Furthermore, if a fluent F is a direct effect of some action A, i.e. Effect + (F , Result (A, s)) holds, then each precondition of A must also hold in the previous situation. That is, we should have rules like:
where In this domain, action OpenDoor has two independent preconditions HasCard and HasKey. If we translate this domain according to our proposal above, we will have the following logic rules:
From the above logic rules, we will deduce both Holds(HasCard , S 0 ) and Holds(HasKey, S 0 ). But from D(Door ), we know that ¬HasKey initially holds. To avoid this kind of contradiction, instead of using rule (24), we should have a weaker rule to derive action preconditions: whenever there is no conflict, we only deduce a minimal number of preconditions to explain an action. Under this principle, we will change rule (24) to the following form:
where i = 1, · · · , k , and fluents
l occur as preconditions in all other action effect propositions of A that have the same effect 9 .
The following rules represent the dual case of rules (23) and (25) corresponding to action effect rule (14):
[¬]Holds(
Now the following definition describes the formal translation from a domain description D of AT 1 into a PLP .
, if it is obtained as follows:
1. Π consists of the following rules: Observation rules: for each observation proposition of (20), there is a rule of the form (22) 
2. Naming function N assigns a unique name to each rule in Π; 3. For each observation rule N o , causal rule N c , action explanation rule N ex and inertia rule N i , the following <-relations hold:
Compared with Definition 4, the PLP translation specified in Definition 8 presents several new features. First, P (23), (25), (26), and (27) . Finally, the extra inertia rules (28) and (29) allow us to reason about fluents' truth values from the current situation to the past. That is, if a fluent f is true (or false, resp.) currently, and there is no explicit information saying that f is not true (or not false, resp.) in the previous situation, or f is caused to be true by some causal rule, or f is true (or false, resp.) as a direct effect of some action, then it derives that f is true (or false, resp.) in the previous situation.
Since both observation and action explanation rules may be defeasible, more possible conflicts may occur in P AT 1 (D). For instance, conflicts may not only occur between causal rules and inertia rules, but also between action explanation rules and inertia rules, observation rules and causal rules, etc.. To solve these possible conflicts, the underlying <-relation is specified as (30) . (30) presents that action explanation rules are most preferred because the execution of an action usually override defeasible causal and inertia rules, while observation rules are less preferred than inertia rules due to the intuition that a fluent's truth value normally persists if there is no explicit action or causal rule to change it.
Note that in P AT 1 (D), action explanation rules (23), (25), (26) and (27) are domain specific because they are specified based on action effect rules (13) and (14).
On the other hand, the new inertia rules (28) and (29) are domain independent. Therefore, we can denote domain independent rules in P AT 1 (D) as follows:
We also denote the set of domain specific rules of P 
, Action explanation rules:
, not ¬Holds(Loaded , s). Naming rules in Π 1 ind : Assigning a unique name to each rule in Π 1 ind . Therefore, we have names N 7 , N 8 , N 9 , N 10 , N 11 , N 12 , N 13 , and N 14 for rules (11), (12), (15), (16), (17), (18), (28) and (29) respectively. <-relations:
That is, we have:
Transition function, models and entailment
Transition function R, structures and models Ψ are defined in the same way as in AT 0 (see section 3.2.2). We denote the entailment relation under Ψ in AT 1 as |= AT 1 . The only thing we should emphasize is that since we allow a domain description to include defeasible initial observation propositions, it is possible that one initial observation proposition conflicts with the other. Therefore, different initial statesŜ 0 may be deduced from different answer sets of the corresponding translated PLP P
Example 7 Example 5 continued. In the shooting action scenario as described in Example 5, the question we are interested in is when the turkey died and whether the gun was actually loaded initially. This is a question about postdiction that we need to reason from the current situation to the past. After translating the domain description D(Shooting-1) into P AT 1 (Shooting-1) as illustrated in Example 6, we obtain the following results:
where the first solution says that the turkey was dead after the execution of action Shoot , and the second indicates that initially the gun was actually loaded, which defeats the original observation.
AT 2 : Representing Actions with Defeasible and Abnormal Effects
It is common that in temporal reasoning under some circumstances, an action might be abnormally executed and the original expected action effect is defeated. Sometimes, an abnormal effect associated with this action may be also produced. Consider the classic shooting scenario, e.g. (Sandewall, 1994) , in which it is usually assumed that if the gun is loaded, then the shoot action causes a direct effect that the turkey is not alive. However, it is probably more natural to treat shoot as a defeasible action. For instance, if the bullet is dumb, the turkey would be still alive after executing action shoot, or it could be an abnormal effect of shoot if after shooting the turkey is still alive but the pigeon is dead. In this section, we try to further generalize our action language AT 1 to AT 2 in order to capture actions with defeasible and/or abnormal effects as described above.
Syntax of AT
2
AT 2 includes the same forms of observation propositions, causal propositions, and value propositions of AT 1 , but has different forms of action effect propositions.
First, an action effect proposition of AT 2 is of the following form:
where A is an action and L, L 1 , · · · , L k are fluent expressions. Intuitively, this action effect proposition is defeasible since we consider that if an action is abnormally executed, its normal effect then cannot be produced. Therefore, the following action abnormal effect proposition represents the abnormal effect of an action:
Finally, an abnormal condition proposition represents the condition under which an action can be considered to be abnormal:
Usually, the abnormality of an action can be identified from observations on the changes of some particular fluents' truth values before and after the action execution. Hence, (34) says that if
propositions, action effect propositions, abnormal action effect propositions, and abnormal condition propositions. The following example shows how we can use AT 2 to represent domains where actions may have abnormal or/and defeasible effects.
Example 8
Let us consider a different shooting scenario named Shooting-2 in which action Shoot has a defeasible effect and it is abnormally executed if initially the gun is loaded and after performing the action, the turkey is observed still alive. Initially the gun is loaded and turkey is alive. This scenario is easy to formalize by using AT 2 .
We specify a domain description D(Shooting-2) that has the following observation propositions:
initially Loaded is observed, initially Alive is observed, a defeasible action effect proposition:
Shoot normallly causes ¬Alive if Loaded , and an abnormal condition proposition:
Shoot is abnormal if before Loaded after Alive.
Semantics of AT
2
Similarly to previous languages AT 0 and AT 1 , we will propose a transition system to provide a formal semantics of AT 2 . Again, this transition system is defined based on a translation from a domain description of AT 2 into a PLP. Intuitively, atom Ab(a, s) expresses that action a is abnormally executed at situation s, while atoms AbEffect + (f , s) and AbEffect − (f , s) are used to represent abnormal effects of actions (see the following for detail).
Considering the defeasibility of action executions, we need to modify our original action effect rules (13) and (14) presented in section 3.2 to the following forms respectively:
Rule (35) (or (36) resp.) says that if A's preconditions [¬]Holds(F 1 , s), · · · , [¬Holds(F k , s) hold, and there is no explicit information stating that A is abnormally executed at situation s, then fluent F will be true (or false, resp.) in situation Result (A, s) as a direct effect of A. Additionally we also need a generic schema for any action a:
which simply expresses that if there is no explicit information saying that action A is abnormally executed at situation s, then it is assume that A is not abnormally executed at situation s. To simplify our following presentation, we denote
Consequently, action explanation rules (23) and (26) in AT 1 are also modified as follows respectively:
(38) states that if fluent F is true in situation Result (A, s), and there is no evidence to show that (a) F is true in the previous situation s; (b) F is caused to be true in situation Result (A, s); and (c) action A is abnormal at situation s, then it is derived that F must be a direct effect of action A in situation Result (A, s). (39) has a similar interpretation.
As we mentioned earlier, some actions with defeasible effects may also produce abnormal effects. Hence, we also specify action abnormal effect rules of the following forms:
Basicly, rule (40) (or (41) resp.) says that if conditions [¬]Holds(F 1 , s), · · ·, [¬]Holds(F l , s) hold and A is abnormally executed, then fluent F will be true (or false resp.) as an abnormal effect of A in situation Result (A, s). Rule (44), on the other hand, is a direct translation of abnormal condition proposition (34). Clearly, rules (42) and (43) are domain independent while rules (40), (41) and (44) 
2. Naming function N assigns a unique name to each rule in Π; 3. For each observation rule N o , causal rule N c , action effect rule N eff , action explanation rule N ex , and inertia rule N i , there are <-relations (30):
Note that inertia rules (45) and (46) are a natural extension of inertia rules (28) and (29) in P AT 1 (D) respectively. The <-relations in AT 2 are specified in a similar way as in P AT 1 (D) except one more schema (47) is added. This is because in P AT 2 (D) action effect rules (35) and (36) are defeasible, possible conflicts between these rules and other defeasible rules (e.g. causal rules, inertia rules and observation rules) may occur indirectly through the action abnormal effect rule (44). Therefore, <-relations (30) (see section 4.2) and (47) are needed as we always assume that an action's successful execution should have the highest priority. We denote domain independent rules in P AT 2 (D) as follows:
}, and denote the set of domain specific rules by Π 2 spec .
Transition function, models and entailment
Transition function R, structures and models Ψ of AT 2 are defined exactly the same as in section 3.2.2. The entailment relation under Ψ in AT 2 is denoted as |= AT 2 . Again, it is observed that the initial state of a domain description D of AT 2 may not be unique due to a possible conflict occurring between two defeasible initial observation propositions in D. 
Action explanation rule:
Action abnormal effect rule:
Naming rules in Π Since the action effect rule N 3 is defeasible, it is not difficult to see that a conflict on the truth value of Holds(Alive, Result (Shoot , S 0 )) occurs between rule N 3 and an inertia rule which is an instance of the generic inertia rule (17) included in Π 2 ind 11 . However, this conflict is solved by N 3 < N ′ . Therefore, we have the final result D(Shooting-2) |= AT 2 ¬Alive after Shoot, from which it is concluded that action Shoot is not abnormally executed.
Characterizations of Action Domains
Among all action domains specified by languages AT 0 , AT 1 and AT 2 , there are some classes of action domains that may have more desirable properties than other classes of domains. In this section, we investigate these desirable properties and characterize different action domains within languages AT 0 , AT 1 and AT 2 respectively.
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In particular, we will explore the following questions that are important for evaluating an action formulation: (a) How can we decide whether an action domain description is consistent (has a model)? (b) Given an action domain description, how is a fluent's truth value affected by executing some acion(s)? (c) Under what conditions does the reasoning within an action domain become monotonic? and (d) Is it possible to characterize a set of fluents that are temporally definite with respect to the underlying action domain description? For instance, if fluent F 's truth value is known currently, will its truth value be also known after some action or action sequence is executed? Furthermore, we will also discuss how to improve our action formulation to handle domain dependent preferences so that they can be suited for more general cases in reasoning about action.
Consistency of action domains
In this subsection, we consider the problem of how we can decide if a domain description is consistent (has a model). In our semantics development, the transition function R is defined based on a translation from the underlying domain description D to a PLP. Hence, it is not difficult obtain a general PLP characterization for consistent domain descriptions. has a consistent answer set.
Proposition 1, however, can not always be used as a feasible way to decide the consistency of a domain description because in general deciding whether a PLP has an answer set is NP-complete (Zhang, 2001) 12 . So it is important to study syntactic characterizations on different cases. Our investigation on this issue starts from language AT 0 .
Characterizing consistent action domains of AT
0
Given a domain description D of AT 0 , we first introduce the following notions:
For convenience, we use F − Initial to denote the set containing those complementary elements of F − Initial . That is, 12 Note that deciding whether an extended logic program has an answer set is also NP-complete (Marek & Truszczyński, 1993) .
Similar notations may be used for other sets, e.g.
Intuitively, if two fluent expressions are mutually exclusive, it means that these two fluent expressions cannot be both true in any state. Based on the concept of mutual exclusion, we will provide a sufficient condition to decide the consistency of a domain description. Before we present the result, we need to introduce further notions. For a domain description D, we assign a unique label l to each proposition in D so that we can use l to refer a proposition in D. Let l be a causal or action effect proposition in D. That is, l has one of the following forms:
We use pre(l ), default (l ) and eff (l ) to denote the set {L 1 , · · · , L m }, {L m+1 , · · · , L n } and {L} respectively. Clearly, default (l ) = ∅ if l is an action effect proposition or the causal proposition does not include absent fluent expressions. For the case that l is an initial proposition initially L, pre(l ) = default (l ) = ∅ and eff (l ) = {L}.
Definition 11
Given a domain description D of AT 0 . Two propositions l and l ′ in D are complementary if one of the following conditions holds: (i) both l and l ′ are causal propositions, and eff (l ) is a complement of eff (l ′ ); (ii) l is a causal proposition, l ′ is an action effect proposition, and eff (l ) is a complement of eff (l ′ ), i.e.
(iii) both l and l ′ are action effect propositions of the same action, and eff (l ) is a complement of eff (l ′ ), i.e.
Definition 12
Given a domain description D of AT 0 . D is normal if D satisfies all of the following conditions.
Let us explain the intuition behind a normal domain description in some details. Condition (i) ensures a consistent initial state deduced from the domain description D. Condition (ii), on the other hand, says that for each causal proposition in D, the complement of its effect should not occur in its preconditions, and furthermore, the effect of this causal proposition does not occur in the absence component (i.e. the default part) of all other (including itself) causal propositions in D. Finally, Condition (iii) represents a non-trivial restriction for complementary propositions in D. Since two complementary propositions may cause two complementary fluents to be true in some state, this condition actually indicates that if there are two complementary propositions in the domain description, then the effects of these two propositions cannot be both true in any state. The following theorem gives a sufficient condition to guarantee a domain description to be consistent.
Theorem 2 Every normal domain description of AT
0 is consistent.
Characterizing consistent action domains of AT 1 and AT
2
Now we try to investigate an analogue of Theorem 2 for AT 1 and AT 2 . As AT 2 is viewed as an extension of AT 1 , here we only need to consider domain descriptions of AT 2 . To achieve our purpose, we must modify the concept of mutual exclusion of fluent expressions in order to cover observation and abnormal action effect propositions in a domain description that are not allowed in AT 0 . In particular, we define
As a special case, F + ǫ is formed based on initial observation propositions of D. Let Given domain description D, we use label l to (uniquely) refer to an observation proposition, causal proposition, action effect proposition, or action abnormal effect proposition. Then notions pre(l ), default (l ) and eff (l ) are defined in an obvious way. Two fluent expressions L and
Finally, we should also modify the definition of complementary propositions as follows.
Definition 13
Given a domain description D of AT 1 or AT 2 . Two propositions l and l ′ in D are complementary if one of the following conditions holds: (i) both l and l ′ are causal propositions and eff (l ) is a complement of eff (l ′ ); (ii) l is a causal proposition and l ′ is an action effect or abnormal effect proposition and eff (l ) is a complement of eff (l ′ ); (iii) both l and l ′ are action effect propositions of the same action where eff (l ) is a complement of eff (l ′ ), i.e.
(iv) both l and l ′ are action abnormal effect propositions of the same action and eff (l ) is a complementary of eff (l ′ ), i.e.
The following definition then extends the concept of normal domain description to AT 1 and AT 2 . 
Definition 14
2 in D, eff (l i )∩pre(l i ) = ∅ and default (l i ) ∩ eff (l j ) = ∅ (i, j = 1, 2); (iii) For any pair (l , l ′ ) of complementary propositions in D, there is a pair of fluent expressions (L, L ′ ) in D such that L and L ′ are mutually exclusive, where L ∈ pre(l ) and L ′ ∈ pre(l ′ ).
Theorem 3
Every normal domain description of AT 1 or AT 2 is consistent.
Cause of change on fluents' truth values
In the rest of the paper, our discussion will focus on consistent action domains. First, the following theorem illustrates a basic property of any (consistent) action domain of AT 0 showing that a fluent's truth value can only be affected by some action effect proposition or causal proposition.
Theorem 4
Let D be a consistent domain description and P AT 0 (D) the corresponding PLP translation of D. Then the following results hold.
While the intuition of Theorem 4 is quite clear, it, however, does not hold for action domains of AT 1 and AT 2 since observation propositions of the form (20) 
Theorem 6
Let D be a consistent domain description of AT 2 and P where A is not an empty string of actions. Then the following results hold.
(i) If D |= AT 2 ¬F after A, and D |= AT 2 F after A · A, then one of the following results holds:
14 Without further explanation, this notion is also used in our other statements presented in this section.
(ii) If D |= AT 2 F after A, and D |= AT 2 ¬F after A · A, then one of following results holds: Result (A, S ) ).
Restricted monotonicity
Monotonicity is a desirable property for reasoning about action in the sense that whenever new domain specific information is added to a domain description, no previous conclusion will be retracted. However, it is well known that most current action formulations are nonmonotonic in general. In this subsection, we investigate some restricted monotonicity for action domains. Formally, let D be a domain description of 
Definition 15
A domain description D of AT i (i = 0, 1, 2) is monotonic with respect to observa-
It is clear that in general O-monotonicity does not hold for any domain description D due to a possibility that in the PLP translation of D ′ , some new added observations may defeat previous conclusions derived through defeasible causal rules, inertial rules, action effect rules or action explanation rules. As an alternative, we can investigate proper restricted conditions under which O-monotonicity holds.
Intuitively, Theorem 7 says that to guarantee a domain description D of AT 0 to be O-monotonic, (i) all causal propositions in D should be non-defeasible, and (ii) all fluents involved in initial propositions, action effect propositions and causal propositions should be irrelevant in such a way: fluents involved in positive (or negative, resp.) initial propositions should be disjoint with fluents involved in negative (or positive, resp.) action effect and causal propositions, and fluents involved in positive action effect and causal propositions should be disjoint with fluents involved in negative action effect and causal propositions. Let P that is drived through some causal rules at the initial situation S 0 . Condition (ii), on the other hand, guarantees that initiating any action effect rules or causal rules by adding new initial fact rules into P AT 0 (D) will not affect any previous facts drived through old initial fact rules, action effect rules, or causal rules.
An analogous result of Theorem 7, however, does not hold for domain descriptions of AT 1 and AT 2 . In fact, since both AT 1 and AT 2 allow domain descriptions to have observations not only at the initial state but also at any other intermediate states, the property of O-monotonicity is hard to be achieved. For instance, consider the PLP translation P
Holds(F , S ) and Holds(F , S ) is derived through instances of action explanation rules (23) and (25) 
then adding a new observation rule Holds(F ′ , S ) ← into P 
Temporal definiteness
Besides O-monotonicity, there is also a class of action domains that satisfies a socalled temporal definiteness property in temporal reasoning. Consider a domain description D. We say that D is temporally definite if for any value proposition of the form (4)
, where A is a substring of A ′ , i.e. A ′ = A·A 1 · · · A k . Intuitively, temporal definiteness expresses a kind of definite information on fluents' truth values with respect to actions. For instance, if the switch is on initially, then we would expect that no matter what actions are executed afterward, the switch should be either on or off. It would be undesirable if after executing some actions, the status of switch becomes unknown.
As only deterministic actions are considered in our context, the temporal definiteness seems a reasonable requirement for our temporal reasoning. It is easy to verify that domain descriptions D(Switch-Power ) and D(Switch-Power ′ ) described in section 3 are temporally definite. However, as defeasible information is allowed in domain descriptions, this property does not always hold.
Example 10
Consider a scenario where there are constraints: (1) birds normally can fly; (2) a wounded bird normally cannot fly. Suppose we initially know that a specific bird Tweety is not wounded. Then after being shot, Tweety is wounded. What we are interested in is whether Tweety can fly after she is shot. We name this scenario Shooting-3 which can be described by our action language AT 0 . Let D (Shooting-3) be a domain description of AT 0 including the following propositions: So D (Shooting-3) is not temporally definite. But intuitively, we would prefer that Tweety cannot fly after being shot because causal rule N 3 seems to be more specific than N 2 . Solving this problem involves the issue of representing domain-dependent preference which will be discussed in section 6.5.
The converse of Lemma 1, however, does not hold. That is, for a temporally definite domain description, its PLP translation may have more than one answer set. For instance, in domain description D(Shooting-3) described above, if we initially know that Tweety is already wounded, then the modified domain description becomes temporally definite but its PLP translation will still have more than one answer sets, i.e. one answer set includes Holds(Fly, S 0 ) while the other includes ¬Holds(Fly, S 0 ).
Lemma 1 actually presents a sufficient condition to ensure a domain description to be temporally definite. Observing Example 10, we can see that P AT 0 (Shooting-3) has more than one answer set because two causal rules N 2 and N 3 conflict with each 15 For simplicity, here we omit the explicit description of naming function N and <-relations.
other on fluent Fly's truth value in situation Result (Shoot , S 0 ), while Fly's truth value is initially true, i.e. P AT 0 (Shooting-3) |= Holds(Fly, S 0 ). This observation motivates our examination on the structure of an action domain.
Consider an extended logic program Π. Using a procedure proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz (see Appendix A), we can actually transform Π into a general logic program 16 , denoted by Trans(Π). It has been showed that a sufficient condition to ensure that Trans(Π) has a unique stable model (or answer set under the context of extended logic program) is that Trans(Π) is locally stratified. That means, there does not exist any potential conflict among any rules in Trans(Π) (see Appendix A for a technical description on local stratification). Therefore, we have the following result.
Theorem 8
A domain description D of AT i (i = 0, 1, 2) is temporally definite if its PLP translation P AT i (D) has a unique reduct ∆ i and Trans(∆ i ) is locally stratified.
Theorem 8 implies that to guarantee a domain description D to be temporally definite, no conflict should occur among the same type of defeasible rules after reducing P AT i (D) to its reduct ∆ i . In Example 10, since two causal rules N 2 and N 3 contain a potential conflict with each other, it causes D(Shooting-3) to be not temporally definite. However, conflicts between different types of defeasible rules will not affect the temporal definiteness for a domain description because such a conflict can be resolved during the process of generating a reduct of the PLP translation of the domain description.
Indefiniteness and domain-dependent preferences
As we mentioned before, temporal definiteness is a desirable property in temporal reasoning. However, it is also the fact that sometimes a domain description which is not temporally definite may still present right results from our intuition. For instance, in the domain of Switch-Power presented in section 3, if we add one more causal proposition into D(Switch-Power ):
¬On is caused if with absence Power . which says that if there is no explicit information stating that there is power, then it is assumed that the light is not on, the circumstance will then change. Suppose that initially we know that the light is not on, the switch is off, and there is no any information about if there is power. Then after turning on the switch, we would like to know whether the light is on. It is not difficult to show that the modified domain description, say D(Switch-Power ′′ ), is not temporally definite. Specifically, we have
Although action Turn-On is deterministic (see its effect proposition in Example 4 in section 3.2.2), the above indefinite result seems reasonable from our intuition because without having definite information about power, it is impossible to decide whether the light is on after performing action Turn-On due to a conflict between two causal propositions in D(Switch-Power ′′ ). This example reveals that although temporal definiteness sometimes indeed describes a desired property, it should not become a particular restriction on action domains. So far, in our domain descriptions, preferences are used as built-in mechanisms of their PLP translations to handle conflicts among different types of propositions. It is observed that domain-dependent preferences also play important roles in temporal reasoning. For instance, in some domains, it is the case that within the same type of defeasible propositions, one proposition is more preferred than the other. Consider Example 10 presented in section 6.4 once again. We have mentioned that two causal propositions
Fly is caused if with absence ¬Fly, ¬Fly is caused if Wounded with absence Fly, contain a conflict under the circumstance by knowing that Tweety is wounded. This conflict leads D(Shooting-3) to be temporally indefinite. But from our intuition, the second causal proposition seems to represent more specific information than the first causal proposition. Therefore, during the temporal reasoning, once conflict occurs between these two causal rules, we would prefer the second causal proposition to defeat the first one (e.g. the wounded bird Tweety normally cannot fly if we do not know she can fly).
This problem may be handled by including domain-dependent preferences on causal and observation propositions into the corresponding PLP translations of domain descriptions. For instance, in Example 10, we may add preference N 3 < N 2 into P AT 0 (Shooting-3), and then P AT 0 (Shooting-3) becomes temporally definite and the fact ¬Fly after Shoot is entailed from the modified domain description.
In general, to represent domain-dependent preferences in a domain description, we need to extend the language so that preference between two propositions can be explicitly expressed. One way of doing this is to introduce labels in the language and each proposition in the domain description is assigned a unique label. A preference proposition can be proposed as follows:
where l 1 and l 2 are labels for causal or observation propositions in the domain description. Then we define the PLP translation of the extended domain description as (Π, N , < ∪ < C ∪ < O ) (i = 0, 1, 2), where Π, N and < are the same as before, and < C and < O are the preference orderings on causal and observation rules respectively that correspond to the specified preference propositions of the form (51) in the domain description.
In this section, we discuss some related work. In the research of reasoning about action, it is difficult to evaluate various action theories from a systematic standard though some studies on this topic have been developed, e.g. (Sandewall, 1994) .
To compare with competing approaches, people usually have to demonstrate their methods with a small number of typical examples. It is still not clear yet what should be the unified standard for an action theory to satisfy. We feel that it would be rather weak to compare our approach with other action theories just through a small number of examples. As defeasibility handling is the central issue in our action formulation proposed in this paper, we will focus on this point as a major criterion to compare our approach with other methods. An early effort on handling defeasible causal rules in reasoning about action was due to the author's previous work (Zhang, 1999) , in which the author identified the restriction of McCain and Turner's causal theory of actions (McCain & Turner, 1995) and claimed that in general a causal rule should be treated as a defeasible rule in order to solve the ramification problem properly. In (Zhang, 1999) , constraints (1) and (2) simply correspond to defaults Switch : On/On and ¬Power : /¬On respectively. By combining Reiter's default theory (Reiter, 1980 ) and Winslett's PMA (Winslett, 1988 ) the author developed a causality-based minimal change principle for reasoning about action and change which subsumes McCain and Turner's causal theory.
Although the work presented in (Zhang, 1999) provided a natural way to represent causality in reasoning about action, there were several restrictions in this action theory. First, due to technical restrictions, only normal defaults or defaults without justifications are the suitable forms to represent causal rules in problem domains. Second, this action theory did not handle the other two major defeasibilities -defeasible observations and actions with defeasible and abnormal effects.
Probably Jab lonowski, Lukaszewicz and Madalińska-Bugaj's work (Jab lonowski et al., 1996) was one of the early efforts on handling the problem of defeasible observations and actions with abnormal effects. Following Dijkstra's semantics on programming languages (W. Lukaszewcz & Madalińsks-Bugaj, 1995) , they proposed an action theory in which both defeasible observations and actions with abnormal effects were expressible. Their work actually presented a few new features. For instance, by employing Dijkstra's semantics in action theory, their method reduced the computational cost in action reasoning; it also dealt with both temporal prediction and postdiction reasoning while incomplete information is allowable in problem domains.
However, the major limitation of this approach is that it did not solve the ramification problem properly. To deal with domain constraints in action scenarios, the action theory has to be extended by adding statements like A; release(F1); · · · ; release(Fn ), which means that fluents F 1 , · · · , F n involved in domain constraints may not obey the inertia rule with respect to the performance of action A (W. Lukaszewcz & Madalińsks-Bugaj, 1995) . For example, if we combine a constraint like "the fact that the turkey is not alive implies that the turkey is not walking" into the previous shooting scenario, in order to derive an indirect effect ¬Walk of action Shoot, a statement like Shoot ; release(Walk ) has to be added into the action theory. But to specify such statements, we have to know how each action exactly affects fluents involved in the domain constraint. Obviously for a complex problem domain this usually is not practicable without taking causality into account. Not surprisingly, due to such restriction, this approach is also hard to be extended to handle defeasible constraints in reasoning about action.
Baral and Lobo recently also proposed an action formulation to address the issue of defeasible constraints and actions with defeasible effects (Baral & Lobo, 1997) . Following a similar spirit of Gelfond and Lifschitz's action language A (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1993 ), Baral and Lobo proposed an action language named ADC to describe action domains in which both defeasible constraints and actions with defeasible effects are admitted. In their language ADC a defeasible constraint like (1) is represented as As showed in (Baral & Lobo, 1997) , ADC has a simple syntax. Based on an extended logic program translation, a transition system is defined to provide a formal semantics of ADC.
It is worth to mention that our idea of defining semantics for AT 0 , AT 1 and AT 2 is similar to Baral and Lobo's proposal for ADC. Both of these two approaches directly use logic programs to define a transition system for the action language, instead of developing a separate semantics like A language. Also, both approaches define states in a different way from the standard A language, that is, instead of defining a state to be a truth value assignment on fluents, these two approaches define a state to be a collection of fluent expressions so that incomplete information about fluents becomes allowable. Nevertheless, some restrictions exist in action language ADC: it can only reason about forward, i.e. temporal prediction, and observations on intermediate situations and final situation are not expressible. Therefore, their approach cannot deal with temporal postdiction. On the other hand, although actions with defeasible effects are allowed in the domain description, it seems that the issue of solving conflicts between defeasible action effect propositions and defeasible constraints was not addressed in detail.
Finally, we briefly mention Geffner's recent work on causal theory of action (Geffner, 1997) which is closely related to models of causal reasoning based on Bayesian networks and structural equation models (Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1992) . To provide a well-founded solution to the ramification problem, Geffner claimed that causal rules of the domain should be defeasible in general. Although with a very different language and methodology, Geffner's system actually addressed the same problem discussed in (Zhang, 1999) and (Baral & Lobo, 1997) . However, from the viewpoint of defeasibility handling, this system is restricted because defeasible observations and actions with defeasible and abnormal effects were not considered.
Conclusions
We have developed a unified action formulation to handle three types of defeasibilities in reasoning about action. Our formulation consists of three action languages named AT 0 , AT 1 and AT 2 respectively. We have showed that our action formulation is applicable to both temporal prediction and postdiction with incomplete information while defeasible constraints, defeasible observations and actions with defeasible and abnormal effects are admitted. As discussed in the previous section, although the issue of defeasibility in reasoning about action has been addressed by some researchers recently, our work presented here is the first effort to handle various defeasible information in temporal reasoning by using a prioritized logic programming approach. It enhances the viewpoint that the logic programming languages can be employed as efficient low level formal languages for reasoning about action.
Besides the author's work (Zhang & Foo, 1997a) , different prioritized logic programming formalisms have been proposed recently, e.g. (Brewka, 1996; Brewka & Eiter, 1999; Grosof, 1997) . The reason why we choose our PLPs to develop our action formulation is as follows. First we think that the answer set semantics for PLPs provides an intuitive and natural interpretation for conflict resolution in logic programs, and hence it is easy to use not only in reasoning about action, but also in other aspects of modeling system dynamics (Zhang & Foo, 1997b; Zhang & Foo, 1998) . Second, a propositional prioritized logic programming system (PLPS) has been implemented recently by the author and his students (Y et al., 2001) . We believe that our PLPS can finally provide a practical programming language prototype for representing actions with the capability of the defeasibility handling within the framework we proposed in this paper.
The computational issue of prioritized logic programs has been addressed in the author's another work (Zhang, 2001) . Briefly, the author has proved that for a propositional prioritized logic program, deciding whether it has an answer set is NP-complete, and deciding whether a given ground literal is entailed from this prioritized logic program is Π P 2 -complete. It is also easy to observe that since a rule containing variables in a PLP is viewed as a set of ground instances of this rule by replacing variables with all possible constants occurring in the PLP, under the case that a PLP does not have function symbols, the number of defeated rules eliminated from this PLP as described in Definition 2 is always finite. Hence, we can always compute a finite reduct of such PLP 17 . In the case that there are function symbols occurring in a PLP, the situation is different. Basically, the set of ground instances of a rule, that includes variables and function symbols, may be infinite and therefore it might be possible that there are infinite number of defeated rules which should be eliminated from the original PLP. Under this situation, a reduct containing infinite rules may be produced according to Definition 2. From a practical viewpoint, we are only able to deal with finite reducts. To overcome this problem, we can set a proper restriction on the variable substitution. For instance, in the modified Switch-Power domain discussed in Example 4 (see section 3.2.2), if all we are interested is to know what are the effect after actions Cut-Power and Turn-On are executed, then in the computation of the answer set of P AT 0 (Switch-Power ′ ), we only need to consider situations S 0 , Result (Turn-On, S 0 ), Result (Cut -Power , S 0 ), and Result (Turn-On, Result (Cut -Power , S 0 )). This implies that the ground form of PLP P AT 0 (Switch-Power ′ ) only has finite rules and hence it always has a finite reduct.
Finally, we should mention that currently our action formulation cannot represent nondeterministic actions and disjunctive domain information. That is, we only consider deterministic problem domains in this paper. This is due to the limit of prioritized logic programs inherited from extended logic programs. But we would argue that our prioritized logic programs are extendedable to represent disjunctive information by using a similar method described in (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991) for extended logic programs, and our action formulation can then be extended to represent nondeterministic actions.
Y. Zhang
Appendix A: General Logic Programs and Stratification
A general logic program is a finite set of rules of the form
where A, B 1 , · · · , B m , · · · , B n are atoms. Gelfond and Lifschitz developed a transformation to reduce an extended logic program to a general logic program (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991) . Consider an extended logic program Π. For any predicate P occurring in Π, let P ′ be a new predicate of the same arity. Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991) A consistent set S ⊂ Lit is an answer set of Π iff S + is an answer set of Π + .
Definition 16
(Local stratification (Apt & Bol, 1994) ) Let Π be a general logic program.
• A local stratification for Π is a function ψ from the Herbrand base of Π, B Π , to the countable ordinals.
• Given a local stratification ψ, we extend it to ground negative literals 18 by setting ψ(not A) = ψ(A) + 1.
• A rule with form (52) of Π is called locally stratified with respect to a local stratification ψ if for every ground instance of (52),
• Π is called locally stratified with respect to a local stratification ψ if all its rules are. Π is called locally stratified if it is locally stratified with respect to some local stratification.
Proposition 3 (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1988 ) If a general logic program Π is locally stratified, then by treating Π as an extended logic program where each rule does not contain classical negation, it has a unique answer set.
Theorem 1 Every PLP has a reduct.
To proof Theorem 1, we need to introduce the concept of <-partition for a PLP.
Definition 17
Let P = (Π, N <) be an arbitrary PLP. A <-partition of Π in P is a finite collection {Π 1 , · · · , Π k }, where Π = Π 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Π k and Π i and Π j are disjoint for any i = j , such that 1. N (r ) < N (r ′ ) ∈ P(<) implies that there exist some i and j (1 ≤ i < j ) such that r ′ ∈ Π j and r ∈ Π i ; 2. for each rule r ′ ∈ Π j (j > 1), there exists some rule r ∈ Π i (1 ≤ i < j ) such that N (r ) < N (r ′ ) ∈ P(<).
Example 11
Consider a PLP P 3 = (Π, N , <):
It is easy to verify that a <-partition of Π in P 3 is {Π 1 , Π 2 , Π 3 }, where
In fact, this program has a unique answer set {B , C }.
Lemma 2
Every prioritized logic program has a <-partition.
Proof
For a given PLP P = (Π, N , <), we construct a series of subsets of Π as follows: Π 1 = {r | there does not exist a rule r ′ ∈ Π such that N (r ′ ) < N (r )}; Π i = {r | for all rules such that N (r ′ ) < N (r ), r ′ ∈ i−1 j =1 Π j }. We prove that {Π 1 , Π 2 , · · ·} is a <-partition of P. First, it is easy to see that Π i and Π j are disjoint. Now we show that this partition satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 described in Definition 17. Let N (r ) < N (r ′ ) ∈ P(<). If there does not exist any rule r ′′ ∈ Π such that N (r ′′ ) < N (r ), then r ∈ Π 1 . Otherwise, there Y. Zhang exists some i (1 < i) such that r ∈ Π i and for all rules satisfying N (r
, it follows that 1 < j . From the construction of Π j , we also conclude r ∈ Π 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Π j −1 . Since r ′ ∈ Π i , it follows i ≤ j − 1. That is, i < j . Condition 2 directly follows from the construction of the partition described above. Now we show that {Π 1 , Π 2 , · · ·} must be a finite set. Firstly, if Π is finite, it is clear {Π 1 , Π 2 , · · ·} must be a finite set. If Π contains infinite rules, then according to our assumption presented in Section 2, P must be the ground instantiation of some program, say P * = (Π * , N * , < * ) where Π * is finite. Then we can use the same way to define a <-partition for P * . Since Π * is finite, the partition of P * must be also finite:
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1) Let P = (Π, N , <). From Lemma 2, we can assume Π has a partition Π = Π 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Π k . We will show that P has a fixpoint in the process of reduction according to Definition 2. As Π 1 , · · · , Π k are disjoint and for any N (r ) < N (r ′ ), it implies r ∈ Π i and r ′ ∈ Π j where i < j , we can use notation
to illustrate this property. It is easy to see that for each rule in Π i (1 < i < k ), there must exist some j and h that j < i < h such that N (r ′ ) < N (r ) < N (r ′′ ) and r ′ ∈ Π j , r ′′ ∈ Π h . Now we construct a sequence of reductions that starts from those least preferred rules in Π k , then from rules in Π k −1 ∪ Π k , and so on as illustrated below:
, · · · ∈ Π k and r1, r2, · · · satisfy the conditions as stated in Definition 2}; Π (2) = Π (1) − {r1, r2, · · · | r1, r2, · · · ∈ Π k−1 ∪ Π k and r1, r2, · · · satisfy the conditions as stated in Definition 2};
It is observed that in the above reduction process, after obtaining Π (k −1) , no more rules can be eliminated from Π (k −1) by applying the conditions of Definition 2 because after the ith reduction, all orderings inherited from Π k −i+1 < · · · < Π k will no longer play any roles in the further (i +1)th, · · ·, and (k −1)th reductions. In particular, in the ith reduction of obtaining Π (i) , all rules eliminated from Π (i−1)
(note that there may be infinite number of rules to be eliminated in the ith reduction) are due to some rules in Π 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Π k −i which are more preferred than those eliminated rules in Π k −i+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Π k . As k is a finite number, from Definition 2
is also a reduct of P. 
Here we only prove the result for AT 0 , proofs for other cases are similar.
Suppose D has a model Ψ. Then according to Definition 7, for any action string A such that Ψ(A) is defined and any fluent F , F and ¬F cannot be both true in Ψ(A). From the definition of Ψ(A), i.e. Definition 6, it follows that Ψ(A ′ ·A) ∈ R(A, Ψ(A ′ )), where A = A ′ · A. Here we assume that A is not empty (otherwise, Ψ(ǫ) =Ŝ 0 that we will consider next). Also since Ψ's domain is prefix closed, Ψ(A ′ ) is also defined. Then from Defintiion 5 of transition function R, it follows that R(A, Ψ(A ′ ) contains a consistent set of fluent expressions. As this set is directly deduced from some answer set Ans of P AT 0 (D), it concludes that the subset of Ans consisting of all literals of the form Holds(F , S ) or ¬Holds(F , S ) is consistent (note S = S 0 ). Now we consider the case of empty action string. In this case Ψ(ǫ) =Ŝ 0 . As Ψ is a model,Ŝ 0 must be a consistent set. Again, asŜ 0 is deduced from some answer set Ans of P AT 0 (D), it concludes that the subset of Ans consisting all literals of the form Holds(F , S 0 ) or ¬Holds(F , S 0 ) is consistent. Therefore, the subset of Ans of the following form is consistent:
Recall that Ans also contains a subset that consists of atoms of the forms Effect + (F , S ), Effect − (F , S ), Caused + (F , S ) and Caused − (F , S ). Clearly, this subset of Ans is also consistent. So Ans is consistent. Now suppose Ans is a consistent answer set of P it is observed that Π does not contain rules of the following forms:
This actually ensures that Π has an answer set Ans. To show this, we assume that Π does not have an answer set. Then there must exist some literal L * satisfying the condition: for any set S of ground literals (S can be empty) (a) if L * ∈ S , then L * is in the answer set of program Π S (Π S is obtained from Π by doing Gelfond-Lifschitz Y. Zhang transformation on Π in terms of S ); and (b) if L * ∈ S , then L * is not in the answer set of program Π S . It is worth to mention that since Π S does not contain rules including negation as failure sign, Π S always has an answer set. From case (a), it is implied that Π must contain a rule of the form:
On the other hand, from case (b), it is easy to observe that all rules of the form r ′ k +1 cannot be triggered in Π S due to L * ∈ S . That is, some rule of the form r1: L1 ← · · · , notL * , · · · must be contained in Π (we do not exclude the case that L 1 = L * ). This follows that rule r ′ k +1 actually has a form:
such that the deletion of r 1 from Π will cause literal L ′ not to be triggered and hence L * can not be derived from Π S . Without loss of generality, we can assume that Π contains a sequence of rules r 1 , · · · , r k +1 as described above. Now we consider Condition (i). From Condition (i), we know that Π does not contain a pair of rules of the forms: From Condition (iii), we know that in each case of (a), (b) and (c), pos(r ) and pos(r ′ ) cannot be both true in answer set Ans. Hence, for any situation term S , none of these three pairs of atoms Caused + (F , S ) and Caused − (F , S ), Caused + (F , S ) and Effect − (F , S ), or Effect + (F , S ) and Effect − (F , S ) cannot both true in Ans.
This concludes that Ans does not contain any complementary literals Holds(F , S ) and ¬Holds(F , S ) for any F and S . So Ans is a consistent answer set of Π. Furthermore, every answer set of Π is also consistent (Lifschitz & Turner, 1994) . Finally, from the property that a PLP (Π, N , <) has an answer set iff Π has an answer set and every answer set of (Π, N , <) is also an answer set of Π (Zhang, 2001) , it concludes that P AT 0 (D) has a consistent answer set (and its every answer set is also consistent).
Theorem 3 Every normal domain description of AT 1 or AT 2 is consistent.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 but with additional considerations on action explanation rules and action abnormal effect rules in P Holds(F , Result (A, S )) ∈ Ans, and there exists some answer set Ans ′ such that Holds(F , S ) ∈ Ans ′ . Therefore, the fact that Holds(F , Result (S , A)) is true is not due to inertia rules (17) and (18) in P AT 0 (D), but due to action effect rules (13) and (14), or causal rules (9) and (10). That is, P 
It is sufficient to only prove (i). As P (2) action effect rules (13) and (14), or (3) causal rules (9) and (10).
Consider case (1). We suppose there exists some observation rule in P 
The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to that of Theorem 5 as described above. 
